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In a property-rights framework, we study how the organizational form and
quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives. Our model nests
standard property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. We admit general
message-dependent contracts but provide conditions under which non-contingent
contracts are optimal. This allows to fully characterize optimal contracts. First,
we contribute to the foundation of the property-rights theory by characterizing un-
der which circumstances its predictions are correct even when trade is contractible.
Second, we study how the two incentive instruments interact in our symmetric in-
formation framework depending on the environment which is in the spirit of the
multitasking literature. Finally, our model has implications for future empirical
test of the property-rights theory.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The property-rights theory of the ﬁrm (PRT) addresses fundamental questions initially
raised by Coase (1937): why are certain transactions conducted within ﬁrms and not in
markets, and hence what determines the boundaries of the ﬁrm? Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) approached this question by deﬁning a
ﬁrm as a collection of non-human assets: they study how the allocation of ownership rights
inﬂuences the incentives to engage in non-veriﬁable relationship-speciﬁc investments when
only the allocation of property-rights can be speciﬁed in a contract. They derive optimal
ownership structures endogenously, and their incomplete contracts approach has become
a cornerstone of recent discussions about the boundaries of the ﬁrm. However, asset
ownership often interacts with other instruments in generating investment incentives:
an aspect which is neglected by the PRT but has been emphasized by e.g., Holmstrom
and Roberts (1998) who argue that a theory of the ﬁrm should not ignore explicit and
implicit contracts and that ownership patterns can often not be explained by property-
rights considerations alone.1 The literature on the hold-up problem provides support to
this criticism: there, in a setting very similar to the PRT, simple trade contracts which
specify trade quantities often suﬃce to induce ﬁrst-best investments.2 In these models
the boundaries of the ﬁrm would be irrelevant because the parties would be able to sign
the optimal quantity contract independent of the underlying ownership structure. In this
light, it is somewhat surprising that some empirical studies, for example Elfenbein and
Lerner’s (2001) study of internet portal alliances, ﬁnd support for the PRT even when
contractual provisions regarding the level of activity are persuasive.3
Several questions emerge from this discussion. First, when are the predictions of the
PRT correct even when trade, or more generally the degree of interaction, is contractible?
This question about the foundation of the PRT is not only of theoretical interest because
1For related arguments, see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) and Holmstrom (1999). Some other
criticisms which have been raised against the PRT are discussed in the conclusion.
2See e.g., Chung (1991), Hermalin and Katz (1993), Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994), N¨ oldeke
and Schmidt (1995) and Edlin and Reichelstein (1996).
3We discuss Elfenbein and Lerner’s (2001) study in more detail in Section 5.
2an answer would lead to a better understanding of observed ownership patterns and
would help to identify new empirical testing grounds for the PRT. Second, how does
the contractability of trade change the predictions of the PRT? For example, are we
more likely to observe integration when quantity contracts are feasible? And third, how
do asset ownership and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives
depending on the environment? For example, how do optimal quantity contracts between
ﬁrms diﬀer from quantity contracts within ﬁrms?4
Our paper addresses these questions: we study the interaction of asset ownership
and quantity contracts in a setting of symmetric information which contains standard
property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. In the model, two parties want to
interact with each other in order to create a surplus where the degree of interaction,
e.g., the trade quantity or the number of joint projects, is ex-ante contractible. The
parties may trade simultaneously with each other and an outside-market, and we allow
for spillovers between internal and external trade. We focus on ex-ante investments which
are embodied in an asset: the investments might be physical themselves, e.g., a new plant,
or they might increase the size of the market for the asset’s product, e.g., marketing.5
The parties sign a possibly message-dependent contract specifying the organizational
form, the degree of interaction and a transfer payment. The purpose of the contract it is
to generate investment incentives.
In this setting, we show in a preliminary step that under certain assumptions the par-
ties can restrict themselves to message-independent (non-contingent) contracts if only one
of the parties invests or if investments are transferable across parties, i.e., if it does not
matter which of the parties makes the investment. Hart (1995, p. 69) argues that this is
true for many investments in physical capital because such investments are frequently not
speciﬁc to a particular individual. The restriction to non-contingent contracts allows to
fully characterize optimal contracts and to study how the optimal use of the two incentive
instruments, i.e., the organizational form and the degree of interaction, varies depending
4Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) provide examples of such ”inside contracting.”
5The literature has mostly focused on investments in human capital where the presence of the investor
is necessary to recoup the returns of an investment. Our focus on investments in physical capital allows
to fully characterize optimal contracts and to derive some interesting interaction results. If only one of
the parties invests our results qualitatively also hold for an investment in human capital.
3on the environment. Our main ﬁndings are as follows: (1) If only one of the parties
invests the organizational form which the PRT predicts is optimal even when trade is
contractible but other organizational forms which are suboptimal according to the PRT
might be optimal as well. (2) If both parties invest the organizational form which the
PRT predicts might in fact not be optimal. (3) Even when the right choice of organiza-
tional form is important the parties may sign a quantity contract which reduces or even
eliminates the ineﬃciency which the property-rights approach suggests. Hence, while in
the standard property-rights and hold-up literatures only one incentive instrument mat-
ters for generating investment incentives,6 in our model both may be important. (4) More
generally, we provide conditions when the right choice of both incentive instruments is
important for investment incentives and when it is irrelevant which organizational form
the parties choose. However, even when more than one organizational form is optimal
(which is often the case) our model imposes restrictions on the optimal combinations of
the incentive instruments, and hence the model can provide some guidance for future
empirical work. (5) The model allows interesting comparative static exercises with re-
spect to the contractability of interaction and with respect to the payoﬀ functions of the
parties. To illustrate this, we revisit the classic but meanwhile controversial Fisher-Body
case and show how our model lends support to Klein’s (2000)view that a large demand
increase necessitated integration of Fisher-Body by General Motors in order to restore
incentives for investments in physical capital. (6) Finally, based on the nature of the
spillovers between internal and external trade, we discuss some more speciﬁce x a m p l e s
which provide guidance as to when the choice of organizational form is important even
when trade is contractible.
What drives these results? If both parties proﬁt from a higher value of the asset
when trading with each other an investment by one party exerts a positive externality
on the other party, and hence the investments are ”cooperative” in the sense of Che and
Hausch (1999):7 in this case quantity contracts might not be very eﬀective in generating
6With respect to the former, see e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart (1995),
DeMeza and Lockwood (1998), Chiu (1998) and Maskin and Tirole (1999a). With respect to the latter,
see e.g., Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994), N¨ oldeke and Schmidt (1995) and Edlin and Reichelstein
(1996).
7The model of Che and Hausch (1999) is a generalized version of the bilateral trading model of Edlin
and Reichelstein (1996). The main focus of Che and Hausch (1999) is the value of trade contracts for
4investment incentives: an investment by one party increases the threatpoint payoﬀ of
the trading partner from internal trade, and thereby reduces the available renegotiation
surplus. This lowers the ex-post payoﬀ of the investor, and consequently his expected
marginal investment return. When trading externally this eﬀect can be avoided if the
investor owns the asset because then only he can use the asset for external trade. Hence,
whether a quantity contract alone can generate suﬃciently large incentives such that the
choice of organizational form does not matter crucially depends on the degree to which
each of the parties proﬁts from an increase in the asset value. For example, we will show
that if the eﬀect on the asset value is very asymmetric across the parties the PRT may
predict an organizational form which in fact is not optimal.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper is closely related to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts:8
building on work by Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999a)
provide a foundation of the PRT based on the complexity of the environment. In their
model, a buyer and a seller are ex-ante uncertain about which out of a large number of
ex-ante describable widgets creates a surplus ex-post. Only one widget can be traded
ex-post, and Maskin and Tirole (1999a) show that as the number of possible widgets
goes to inﬁnity the advantage from signing a quantity contract becomes negligible. In
addition to providing a similar but somewhat stronger ”irrelevance of quantity contracts”-
result we fully characterize optimal contracts which allows to study the interaction of the
incentive instruments. Whereas Maskin and Tirole (1999a) and most of the literature
restrict attention to selﬁsh investments,9 in our model direct eﬀects of investments on
the trading partner play a crucial role. Hence, Che and Hausch (1999) is the paper most
closely related to our work. However, Che and Hausch (1999) touch only very brieﬂy
on the issue of asset ownership. Especially, they do not explore the interaction of asset
solving the hold-up problem which was initially formalized by Hart and Moore (1988). Other papers
that point out the reduced value of trade contracts when investments are cooperative are Che and Chung
(1999), and in a more general, non-diﬀerentiable setting Schweizer (2000).
8For a critical discussion of the incomplete contract methodology, see Tirole (1999).
9I.e. investments from which only the investor beneﬁts directly. Exceptions to this are e.g., Macleod
and Malcomson (1993), Che and Chung (1999), Che and Hausch (1999) and Rosenkranz and Schmitz
(1999).
5ownership and quantity contracts which is the main focus of our paper.
The literature on multi-tasking and organizational form has provided important in-
sights about the interaction of explicit contracts, implicit contracts and asset ownership
in shaping incentives inside and across institutions. In contrast to the present model, in
general these papers employ a moral hazard framework and assume that signals of the ef-
fort decisions are veriﬁable (see e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Holmstrom and
Tirole (1991)). More recently this framework has been extended to repeated interactions
(see e.g., Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2001) and Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002)).
To keep the analysis tractable, attention is generally restricted to linear incentive con-
tracts and to non-contingent assignments of ownership. In contrast, as the property-rights
literature, we focus on relationships where the parties are symmetrically informed but no
veriﬁable signals are available, and we allow for general message-dependent contracts.
Finally, while our paper focuses on the contractability of the degree of interaction some
recent empirical and theoretical papers study the eﬀects of shifts in the contractability
of investments caused, for example, by developments in monitoring technologies. For ex-
ample, Baker and Hubbard (2000) and Baker and Hubbard (2002) ﬁnd that the adoption
of on-board computers in the U.S. trucking industry led to patterns which reﬂect the
importance of both incomplete contracts and measurement issues. For theoretical work
in this area, see e.g., Hubbard (2001).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we set up the model.
In Section 3 we fully characterize optimal non-contingent contracts for the case that only
one of the parties can invest, where we argue that the results qualitatively hold even when
the investment is in human capital, and for the case of two-sided transferable investments
which are interesting both from an theoretical and empirical point of view. In Section 4
we show that in the cases considered in Section 3 the parties cannot gain by considering
more complicated, message-dependent contracts. In Section 5 we discuss implications
of our model for future empirical work. In Section 6 we extend the model to allow for
spillovers between internal and external trade. There, we discuss some examples which,
based on the nature of the spillovers, provide additional guidance as to when the choice
of organizational form matters even when trade is contractible. Section 7 concludes. All
proof are relegated to an appendix.
62T h e M o d e l
2.1 Description of the Model
A downstream buyer (B) and an upstream seller (S), both of whom are risk-neutral, want
to trade a variable quantity of a good. Even though we phrase the model in terms of
a vertical supply relationship our results equally apply to horizontal relationships if one
interprets the level of trade more generally as the level of interaction between the parties.
The parties may simultaneously trade with each other (internal trade) and a competitive
outside-market (external trade).10 Beside their human capital the parties may use an
asset A, for example a machine, for production and/or trade. The organizational form
O ∈ {B,S,X} determines which party has the residual rights of control over A:t h e
asset may either be owned by the buyer (B)o rb yt h es e l l e r( S). Because the residual
rights of control will only matter for external trade it will play no role who owns the
asset when the parties sign an exclusive dealing clause (X) which forbids both parties
to trade externally.11 Joint ownership of the asset where each party can block the other
party from using A would be equivalent to an exclusive dealing clause, and hence we do
not introduce it explicitly into the model. We assume that B and S have symmetric
information and that they both observe all relevant variables and functions.
Sequence of events Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events. At date 1 the parties
sign a (non-contingent) contract C =( O,q) which is registered with the courts. The
contract speciﬁes the organizational form O ∈ {B,S,X} and the internal trade quantity
q ∈ [0,q] where we assume that it is not possible to produce or trade an unlimited quantity
internally. Only O, q, a transfer payment t ∈ < from B to S at date 4 and messages
which the parties might send between dates 2 and 3 are assumed to be veriﬁable by a
court: because a ﬁxed transfer payment will have no eﬀect on incentives we set t =0
without loss of generality. In Section 4 we show that given our assumptions below the
parties cannot gain by considering more complicated message-dependent contracts like
e.g., option contracts. We assume that the parties can only allow or forbid external trade
10Roider (2000) studies a related model where internal and external trade are mutually exclusive.
11We comment on exclusivity agreements which forbid only one of the parties to trade externally when
we introduce the payoﬀ functions below.
7but that they are not able to regulate external trade in more detail: a court may be able
to verify whether external trade takes place at all but given the large number of potential
external trading partners it may not be possible to verify the exact external trading
quantity. At date 2 the buyer and the seller make relationship-speciﬁc investments β ≤ β
and σ ≤ σ respectively in order to increase the value a(β,σ)o ft h ea s s e tA,w h e r ea is
continuously diﬀerentiable in both arguments. Hence, the investments are embodied
in the asset but they need not necessarily be physical themselves: they might as well
represent the eﬀort which the parties expend to increase the market size for A’s product.
Since our results do not depend on the presence of ex-ante uncertainty about the ex-post
state of nature, for ease of exposition, we do not introduce it into the model.12 Denote
t h ee x - p o s ts t a t eo ft h ew o r l db yθ ≡ (β,σ) ∈ Θ ≡ [o,β] × [o,σ]. Because the parties
have symmetric information we assume that they always renegotiate the initial contract
to an ex-post eﬃcient outcome at date 3.13 We are more explicit on the renegotiations in
Section 2.3 below. Finally, at date 4 production, trade and payments take place.
Figure 1 here
Threatpoint payoﬀs If renegotiations fail the threatpoint payoﬀs b b(O,q,a)a n d
b s(O,q,a) of the buyer and the seller respectively are determined by the initial con-
tract C =( O,q) where we assume that both payoﬀ functions are continuously diﬀeren-
tiable in all variables except O and non-decreasing in the asset value a.I f q>0t h e
contract obliges the parties to trade quantity q internally: we assume that b b(X,q,a)
and b s(X,q,a) represent their respective threatpoint payoﬀs from internal trade where
we suppose that b ba (X,q,a), b sa (X,q,a), b baq (X,q,a), b saq (X,q,a) ≥ 0 ∀q,a.14 More-
over, if O ∈ {B,S} they are free to trade with the outside-market, and consequently
12The model can easily be extended to the case that after investments but before renegotiations a
continuously distributed random variable, which aﬀects the payoﬀs of the parties, is realized. In this
case, all of our results go through as long as Assumptions 3 and 4 below hold for all realizations of the
random state and as long as Assumption 2 below holds in expected terms.
13Whether parties are able to commit not to renegotiate is discussed controversially (see e.g., Hart and
Moore (1999) and Maskin and Tirole (1999b)). We do not deny that under certain circumstances the
parties might be able to commit not to renegotiate but we want to consider renegotiation as a practical
possibility.
14Throughout, subscripts denote partial derivatives.
8[b b(O,q,a) −b b(X,q,a)], [b s(O,q,a) − b s(X,q,a)] > 0 for O ∈ {B,S} represent their re-
spective threatpoint payoﬀs from external trade. For simplicity, we assume that the
external threatpoint payoﬀs of the parties do not depend on the internal trade quan-
tity, i.e., b bq (O,q,a) − b bq (X,q,a)=0∀O,q,a, and analogously for the seller. This
simplifying assumption is dropped in Section 6 where spillovers between internal and
external trade are discussed. Finally, we assume that (i) internal payoﬀs are zero if
no internal trade takes place, i.e., b b(X,0,a)=b s(X,0,a) ∀a, (ii) an owner has resid-
ual control rights over the asset, and hence he can block the non-owner from using
it for external trade which implies that the external payoﬀ of the non-owner does not
vary in the asset value, i.e., [b b(S,q,a) − b b(X,q,a)] = b b(B,q,0) − b b(X,q,0) ∀q,a and
[b s(B,q,a)−b s(X,q,a)] = [b s(S,q,0)−b s(X,q,0)] ∀q,a,15 and (iii) the possibility of exter-
nal trade raises the marginal value of the asset for the owner, i.e., b ba (B,q,a) >b ba (X,q,a)
∀q,a and b sa (S,q,a) > b sa (X,q,a) ∀q,a.
2.2 The First-Best
We assume that it is ex-post eﬃcient for the buyer and the seller to cooperate, and that
by working together they create an ex-post surplus φ(a), possibly through internal and
external trade, where φa (a) > 0a n dφaa(a) < 0 ∀a. The ex-post surplus does not depend
on the initial contract terms (O,q) because the buyer and the seller always agree on the
ex-post eﬃcient actions in renegotiations. Hence, the eﬃcient best-response investment
functions are given by:
β
∗ (σ)=a r g m a x
β≤β
{φ(a(β,σ)) − β}, and
σ
∗ (β)=a r g m a x
σ≤σ
{φ(a(β,σ)) − σ}.
The ex-ante eﬃcient investment pair (β
∗,σ∗)s a t i s ﬁes β
∗ (σ∗)=β
∗ and σ∗ (β
∗)=σ∗,a n d
the eﬃcient asset value is given by a∗ ≡ a(β
∗,σ∗) where we assume that a∗ is unique and
interior.
15This implies that under each O ∈ {B,S} the external payoﬀ of one party does not depend on a.
Therefore, it is not necessary to explicitly consider one-sided exclusivity clauses which forbid only one of
the parties to trade externally because such a clause would have the same eﬀect on investment incentives
as some O ∈ {B,S}.
92.3 Post-Renegotiation Payoﬀs and Investment Equilibrium
The surplus which is generated through renegotiating the initial contract is given by:
∆(O,q,a) ≡ φ(a) −b b(O,q,a) − b s(O,q,a) ≥ 0 ∀O,q,a,
and we assume that the seller and the buyer divide ∆(O,q,a) in Nash-bargaining in
equal parts.16 Hence, the post-renegotiation payoﬀs of the buyer and the seller net of
investment costs are given by:







φ(a)+b b(O,q,a) − b s(O,q,a)
i
, (1)







φ(a)+b s(O,q,a) −b b(O,q,a)
i
. (2)
respectively. Given the initial contract C =( O,q), it follows from (1) and (2) that the
best-response investment functions are deﬁned by:
β (σ;C) = argmax
e β
b B(O,q,a(e β,σ)) − e β,
σ(β;C) = argmax
e σ
b S(O,q,a(β,e σ)) − e σ,
respectively, and an investment equilibrium (e β (C),e σ(C)) is implicitly deﬁned by e β (C)=
β (e σ (C);C)a n de σ (C)=σ(e β (C);C). Hence, given a contract C =( O,q), the net
equilibrium surplus of the relationship between B and S is deﬁned by:
f W(C) ≡ φ(a(e β (C),e σ(C))) − e β (C) − e σ (C).
3 Analysis of the Model
In order to characterize optimal contracts, we ﬁrst derive some properties of the post-
renegotiation payoﬀs and introduce some assumptions. It directly follows from (1), (2)
16The surplus-splitting assumption is solely made for expositional clarity: the model could easily be
generalized to allow for asymmetric bargaining powers, and all of our results would continue to hold
qualitatively. Some papers, e.g., DeMeza and Lockwood (1998), have shown that the optimal ownership
structure might depend on the nature of the bargaining game. In the present paper, the interaction of
asset ownership and quantity contracts is at the center of attention, and therefore we neglect this aspect.
10and the properties of the threatpoint payoﬀst h a t :
b Ba (O,q,a)=φa(a) − b Sa (O,q,a) ∀O,q,a, (3)
b Baq (O,q,a)=−b Saq (O,q,a) ∀O,q,a, (4)
b Sa (S,q,a) > b Sa (X,q,a) > b Sa (B,q,a) ∀q,a, (5)
b Ba (B,q,a) > b Ba (X,q,a) > b Ba (S,q,a) ∀q,a. (6)
If an increase in q has a positive impact on the marginal investment return of the seller it
automatically has a negative impact on the marginal investment return of the buyer, and
vice versa. This arises from the fact that the payoﬀs of the parties depend on investments
only through the asset value a. Moreover, because only the owner can use the asset for
external trade the marginal investment returns can be unambiguously ordered across O.
For the remainder of the paper, we maintain the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 a(e β(C),e σ(C)) > 0, e β(C) < β and e σ(C) < σ for all C.
Assumption 2 b Bββ(O,q,a(β,σ)), b Sσσ(O,q,a(β,σ)) < 0 ∀O,q,β,σ.
Assumption 3 For all O,e i t h e rb Saq (O,q,a) > 0 ∀q,a or b Saq (O,q,a) < 0 ∀q,a holds.
The ﬁrst two assumptions are of technical nature: Assumption 1 ensures that the
equilibrium investment of at least one of the parties is strictly positive. Assumption 2
ensures that the investment equilibrium can be characterized by the appropriate ﬁrst-
order conditions: unfortunately, if the threatpoint payoﬀs of both parties vary in a this is
not guaranteed automatically even if a(·), φ(·), b B(·)a n db S(·) are well-behaved in β and
σ. Finally, Assumption 3 implies that, for each organizational form O, the nature of the
incentive problem does not vary across q and a: to illustrate this point, recall from (4)
that sign{b Baq (O,q,a)}6 = sign{b Saq (O,q,a)} ∀O,q,a, and note that b Saq (O,q,a) > 0 ⇔
b saq (O,q,a) > b baq (O,q,a). Hence, for both parties, Assumption 3 rules out the case that
for some (q,a)-pairs an investment has a large selﬁsh and a small cooperative eﬀect while
t h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ef o ro t h e r( q,a)-pairs. Given these assumptions, we show in Section 4
that in the cases which we consider below, independent of the contractability of trade, the
parties cannot achieve a higher net equilibrium surplus by employing more complicated,
11message-dependent contracts, like e.g., option contracts.17 Hence, if one argues that there
is an (arbitrarily small) cost of writing more complex contracts our restriction to non-
contingent contracts seems to be justiﬁed. For a more detailed discussion of this issue,
see Section 4. The focus on non-contingent contracts allows to pin down the equilibrium
decisions and to fully characterize optimal contracts.18 Finally, in accordance with the
property-rights theory we assume that the external threatpoint payoﬀs of both parties
are relatively unresponsive to increases in a because, when trading externally, the parties
do not have access to the other party’s human capital:
Assumption 4 [b sa (S,q,a) − b sa (X,q,a)], [b ba (B,q,a) −b ba (X,q,a)] < φa (a) ∀q,a.
Optimal contracts An optimal contract e C =(e O,e q) solves the following problem:19
e C ∈ argmax
C
f W(C). (C)
Since the optimal contract is in general not unique we denote the set of optimal orga-
nizational forms by Ω ≡ {O ∈ {B,S,X} /O= e O for some e C}.A s s u m p t i o n3e n s u r e s
that, for a given O, the optimal trade quantity is unique. Note that, if X ∈ Ω, it does
not matter whether the asset is given to the buyer or the seller because in this case the
optimal exclusive quantity contract can be signed regardless of the underlying ownership
structure. Hence:
Deﬁnition 1 We say that it is relevant who owns A if Ω = {B} or Ω = {S},o t h e r w i s ei t
is irrelevant who owns A. Similarly, we say that quantity contracts are relevant if e q>0,
otherwise quantity contracts are irrelevant.
17For this result, Assumption 1 has to hold for all possible message-dependent contracts. This result
is robust to the possibility of randomization across organizational forms.
18The main ideas of the paper still go through even if the restriction of attention to non-contingent
contracts is not possible. In Roider (2000) this is the case because there our Assumption 3 does not hold.
While in that setting it is not possible to fully characterize optimal contracts, Roider (2000) provides
suﬃcient conditions under which it is optimal to sign no trade contract. There, it is illustrated how asset
ownership might interact with simply contingent trade contracts, i.e. contracts where the parties agree
to trade a ﬁxed quantity at a ﬁxed price but, by paying some privately stipulated damages, one of the
parties has the right to withdraw from the contract.
19Note that under the optimal contract there exist ex-ante payments which induce participation by
both parties. Because these payments would not aﬀect investment incentives they are not introduced
explicitly.
12Main eﬀects If trade is non-contractible, because the good to be traded cannot
be described in suﬃcient detail or has yet to be developed, (C) is solved under the
constraint q ≡ 0 (property-rights approach): in this case the optimal organizational
form is generically unique because the ﬁrst-best cannot be achieved.20 But why might
the choice of organizational form be relevant even when trade is contractible? In the
following, we illustrate that investments in physical capital may give rise to externalities
which reduce investment incentives. The contract terms q and O inﬂuence the extent
of these externalities. First, consider the eﬀect of agreeing on a certain q in the initial
contract. For the sake of illustration, suppose that b saq(O,q,a),b baq (O,q,a) > 0 ∀O,q,a:
it is obvious from (2) that, on the one hand, a larger trade quantity leads to higher
investment incentives for the seller because b sa(O,q,a) increases. On the other hand,
since the buyer proﬁts as well from a higher value of the asset there is a countervailing
eﬀect: a larger q leads to a larger threatpoint payoﬀ for the buyer, and hence to a lower
renegotiation surplus. Thereby, the post-renegotiation payoﬀ of the seller is reduced.21
If the latter eﬀect is relatively strong this externality might overcompensate the direct
selﬁsh eﬀect on the seller, and the investment incentives for the seller, which can be
created through the right choice of q,m a yb el i m i t e d . 22 Second, the investment returns
of the parties can be unambiguously ordered across O because only the owner can use
the asset for external trade, and hence only the external threatpoint payoﬀ of the owner
does depend on a (see (5) and (6)). The following notation will be useful:
n(q,a) ≡ b s(X,q,a) −b b(X,q,a) ∀q,a,
b se (a) ≡ b s(S,q,a) − b s(X,q,a) ∀q,a,
b be(a) ≡ b b(B,q,a) −b b(X,q,a) ∀q,a,
(7)
where na (q,a) is a measure of the net selﬁsh eﬀect of an investment by S which arises
through internal trade, where b se
a (a)( b be
a (a)) denotes the marginal change in the external
20If one extends Assumption 1 to hold for all message-dependent contracts, this holds true even if
attention is not restricted to non-contingent contracts and even if one allows for randomization across
organizational forms.
21If the parties do not share the renegotiation surplus in equal parts but asymmetrically the counter-
vailing eﬀect is the larger the larger the share of the investor.
22In Section 6, we consider the eﬀects of q on both the internal and the external threatpoint payoﬀs
of the parties.
13threatpoint payoﬀ of the seller (buyer) when he owns the asset, and where b se
a and b be
a are
independent of q by assumption.
3.1 One-Sided Investment Case
In this subsection, we focus on the case that only the seller is able to make an investment,
i.e., β ≡ 0. For simplicity, we assume a = σ.23 If one interprets O = S as two separate
ﬁrms and O = B as an integrated ﬁrm in which B procures the good internally from S,24
the property-rights approach predicts that two separate ﬁrms will be formed, i.e., (S,0)
is the solution to (C) under the constraint q ≡ 0 (see Proposition 1(vi) below). Hence,
Ω = {S} but the ﬁrst-best cannot be reached. Does this sharp prediction still hold when
trade is contractible?
Intuition Note that, because inequality (5) holds and because b Sa (O,q,a)i sc o n t i n -
uous in q, we still have S ∈ Ω when trade is contractible. However, ownership by the
seller is uniquely optimal only if b Sa (X,q,a∗) − 1 < 0 ⇔ na (q,a∗) < φa (a∗)b e c a u s ei f
this condition does not hold then even under an exclusive contract, i.e., independent of
who owns the asset, the ﬁrst-best could be achieved. Hence, even when the cooperative
eﬀect of σ on b b(X,q,a) is relatively weak a suﬃciently low na (q,a∗) may result such that
the choice of organizational form is relevant. With respect to optimal trade quantities,
note that if Ω = {S} it is optimal to maximize investment incentives by setting e q = q or
e q =0a sl o n ga st h eﬁrst-best is not achieved. If, for a certain O,aq u a n t i t yq = q would
induce overinvestment the parties will reduce the contracted trade quantity accordingly.
If more than one organizational form is optimal it immediately follows from (5) that the
ﬁrst-best is reached and that the optimal trade quantities are related as stated in the
proposition below.
To ease the exposition of the result, deﬁne σq=0 ≡ σ(β =0 ;C =( S,0)), σq=q ≡
σ (β =0 ;C =( S,q)), and, for each O,d e ﬁne qO implicitly by b Sa
¡
O,qO,a ∗¢
=1 . T h e
threshold values in the proposition below are deﬁned as follows: v1 ≡ 2 − φa(σq=0) −
b se
a(σq=0), v2 ≡ 1 − b se
a(a∗)a n dv3 ≡ 1+b be(a∗).
23If only the buyer is able to invest our results hold with obvious modiﬁcations.
24This interpretation is common in the empirical literature on vertical integration. For a critical
discussion of this literature, see Whinston (2001).
14Proposition 1 Take Assumptions 1-4 as given and suppose that only the seller invests.
Then Ω, the set of optimal organizational forms, and the respective optimal quantities e q
are given by:
(i) Ω = {S} iﬀ na (q,a∗) < 1 ⇒ e q =0if na(q,σq=0) <v 1,
e q = qS if na (q,a∗) ≥ v2,
e q = q otherwise,
(ii) Ω = {S,X} iﬀ 1 ≤ na (q,a∗) <v 3 ⇒ e q = qO where qS <q X,
(iii) Ω = {S,X,B} otherwise ⇒ e q = qO where qS <q X <q B,
(iv) In cases (i)(e q = qS), (ii) and (iii) the ﬁrst-best is achieved while in cases (i)(e q =0 )
and (i)(e q = q) equilibrium investment is given by e σ(e C)=σq=0 < σ∗ and
e σ(e C)=σq=q ≤ σ∗ respectively,
(v) qO > 0 and generically qO < q ∀O.H e n c e ,q = q generically implies e σ < σ∗,
(vi) In the special case of non-contractible trade, the uniquely optimal contract, i.e., the
contract which solves (C) subject to the constraint q ≡ 0,i sg i v e nb ye C =( S,0)
which leads to e σ(e C)=σq=0 < σ∗.
Foundations of the property-rights theory Proposition 1 contributes to the foun-
dation of the property-rights theory of the ﬁrm: (1) In the one-sided investment case the
contractability of trade has no impact on the optimality of O = S which is a strength
of the property-rights approach because the PRT derives this prediction under the as-
sumption that q ≡ 0, and hence in a simpler framework. (2) It has been argued, e.g.,
by Holmstrom (1999), that the ability of the property-rights approach to rule out subop-
timal arrangements is perhaps even more important than identifying optimal once. We
show that if trade is contractible the PRT may fail on this account because X or even B
may be optimal, i.e., in contrast to the prediction by the PRT the optimal organizational
form may not be unique. Especially, the choice of organizational form is irrelevant if
na (q,a∗) ≥ 1 holds. Note that (e O = S, e q =0 )i so p t i m a li ﬀ naq (q,a) < 0 ∀q,a holds.
(3) While previous foundations of the PRT describe environments where it is optimal to
write no quantity contract at all and where consequently only the allocation of ownership
matters, we provide conditions under which the PRT is well founded, i.e., Ω = {S} even
when trade is contractible, but the parties additionally sign a quantity contract which
reduces or even eliminates the ineﬃciency which the PRT suggests.
15Contractability and organizational form Proposition 1 has implications beyond
the foundation issue: (1) If only the seller invests ownership of the asset by the buyer,
i.e., in the context of a vertical relationship an integrated ﬁrm, can only be optimal if
trade is contractible: if Ω = {S,X} in addition to integration the parties need to sign
an exclusive dealing contract while if Ω = {S,X,B} integration is optimal with and
without an exclusive clause. (2) Suppose that trade is initially non-contractible (such
that O = S is uniquely optimal) but subsequently becomes contractible, for example due
to standardization after an development phase. In this case, the model suggest that a
change of organizational form is not necessary. Note that, as we will show below, this
holds not necessarily true in the two-sided investment case.25
Interaction between organizational forms and quantity contracts Proposition
1 implies that even when the model allows only limited or no predictions regarding O it
still imposes restrictions on the optimal combinations of O and q:( 1 )O n c ew eo b s e r v e
more than one organizational form qS <q X <q B has to hold, i.e. if in a vertical
context both separate and integrated ﬁrms are observed the contracted quantities should
be higher in the latter than in the former. (2) However, if the parties sign an exclusive
dealing contract, i.e., O = X, the model predicts the same trade quantities independent
of who owns the asset. (3) Trade contracts can only be irrelevant, i.e., e q =0 ,i fΩ = {S}.
Hence, the lack of a quantity contract can only be optimal between ﬁrms. Moreover, if
(e O = S,e q = 0) is observed empirically the model predicts that the optimal organizational
form is unique: hence, in all relationships identical to the one under consideration only
e O = S, i.e., only separate ﬁrms, should be observed.
Eﬃciency By observing certain contract terms one can draw inference about the
eﬃciency of the relationship: (1) Whenever q =0o rq = q is observed we know that
generically the ﬁrst-best is not achieved. Moreover, it follows from Proposition 1 that
in this case the optimal O is unique, i.e. Ω = {S}, and hence no other organizational
form should be observed empirically. (2) Conversely, if we observe (a) more than one
organizational form, (b) that the parties sign an exclusive dealing contract, or (c) an
25The model also allows interesting comparative static exercises with respect to the payoﬀ functions
of the parties (for example, changes due to cost or demand shocks). This is illustrated by means of the
Fisher-Body case in Section 3.2 below.
16interior trade quantity the model implies that the ﬁrst-best is achieved.
To summarize, we have shown that the set of optimal organizational forms crucially
depends on na (q,a∗): if the non-investor proﬁts suﬃciently from an increase in the value
of the asset, for example because a better asset allows a higher quality product or because
the investment increases the size of the market for the assets product, then, even if trade
is contractible, we have Ω = {S} as under the property-rights approach. Nevertheless,
the parties may still ﬁnd it worthwhile to sign a quantity contract to generate additional
investment incentive. Finally, one can show that all of the above results extend to the case
of a one-sided investment in human capital: in this case, the non-investor only beneﬁts
from an improvement in the human capital of the investor if both parties interact with
each other but he does not beneﬁt if he trades with the outside-market.
3.2 Transferable Investments
When both parties may invest the model allows additional insights. For example, we will
show that, in contrast to the one-sided case, it is possible that an integrated ﬁrm is strictly
optimal when trade is non-contractible while two separate ﬁrms are strictly optimal when
trade is contractible. Hence, in the two-sided case the property-rights approach may give
a misleading prediction with respect to optimal organizational forms. While this problem
exist in general we restrict attention to the case of two-sided transferable investments for
the remainder of this section:
Assumption 5 a(β,σ) ≡ β + σ.
Transferable investments are interesting from an applied point of view, and they pos-
sess some useful analytical properties: (1) Investments are transferable in many contexts:
for example, Hart (1995, p. 69) argues that investments in physical capital are often
not speciﬁc to a particular party but are transferable in the sense that while they are
relationship-speciﬁc it does not matter which of the parties to a relationship invests.
Furthermore, in many horizontal relationships, as for example in horizontal production
joint ventures, the parties contribute a homogenous input to the venture. Similarly, in
marketing alliances the parties often just contribute money which might nevertheless be
17diﬃcult to verify.26 In all of these cases, only the total amount invested matters. (2) From
a theoretical perspective, we will show in Section 4 that with transferable investments
the restriction of attention to simple contracts of the form (O,q) for some O ∈ {B,S,X}
and q ∈ [o,q]i sj u s t i ﬁed because this restriction does not lead to an eﬃciency loss.27
When both parties make non-transferable investments the parties can in general gain by
randomizing over organizational forms which complicates the analysis considerably, and,
from a theoretical point of view, there is no obvious reason why randomization in the
initial contract should be ruled out.28 (3) Finally, in the case of transferable investments
one can isolate how the optimality of a contract depends on its impact on the threatpoint
payoﬀs of the parties which is the main focus of the present paper. In general, the form
of an optimal contract also depends on the exogenously given importance of each invest-
ment for increasing total surplus. When investments are transferable both investments
are equally important by deﬁnition, and the later consideration is irrelevant.
Investment equilibrium If investments are transferable then, for a given investment
σ by the seller, the buyer will invest up to the point where b Ba (O,q,β + σ)=1 .H e n c e ,
the investment best-response functions are given by β(σ;C)=m a x {aB(C) − σ,0} and
σ(β;C)=m a x {aS(C)−β,0} where aB(C) ≡ argmaxa{b B(O,q,a)−a} and where aS(C)
is deﬁned analogously. Hence, the investment equilibrium (e β(C),e σ(C)) is given by (i)
(aB(C),0) if aB(C) >a S(C), (ii) (0,a S(C)) if aB(C) <a S(C) and (iii) (β,σ) such that
β + σ = aB(C) otherwise. Note that generically only one of the parties will invest in
equilibrium which eases the analysis considerably. Total equilibrium investment is given
by e a(C) ≡ max{aB(C),a S(C)}.N o t et h a ts i n c et h eaj(C)’s are continuous in q, e a(C)i s
continuous in q as well. The properties of the investment equilibrium are illustrated in
Figure 2 below.
Figure 2 here
26Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, p. 88) highlight that due to ”creative accounting” opportunities even
monetary contributions might be hard to verify. For example, if the money is used to buy certain inputs
or services the investor might collude with the provider of the input in order to overstate its price.
27For a more detailled discussion of this issue, see Section 4.
28However, as the proof of Proposition 3 shows, even in the non-transferable case, the parties cannot
gain by signing message-dependent contracts.
18Intuition We will show below that if investments are transferable and trade is non-
contractible the optimal organizational form is generically unique but it depends on the
parameter values whether Ω = {S} or Ω = {B}.29 Why might the maximization of
(C) subject to q ≡ 0, i.e., the property-rights approach, fail to identify the optimal
organizational form when trade is contractible? Recall from (4) that b Baq(O,q,a)=
−b Saq(O,q,a) ∀O,q,a. Hence, if the investment incentives of one party are decreasing in
q they are automatically increasing in q for the other party. In the one-sided case, because
of (4), this observation had no impact on the optimality of O = S. In the following, for
deﬁn i t e n e s s ,w ef o c u so nt h ec a s et h a tO = B is optimal when trade is non-contractible.30
Then, if trade is contractible, because of (4), it is perfectly possible that the incentives
of S are increasing in q and that it is optimal to raise the incentives of S even further by
giving him ownership of the asset. Note that in equilibrium generically only one of the
parties will invest, and that inequalities (5) and (6) hold. Hence, the above observations
imply that the choice of organizational form is only relevant, i.e., X/ ∈ Ω, if, for both
parties, specifying a large trade quantity in the initial contract generates only relatively
low incentives: a case which arises if the internal gains from increases in the asset value
are relatively similar for both parties. However, even if the choice of organizational form
is relevant, i.e., if Ω = {S} or Ω = {B}, it is still possible that the ﬁrst-best is achieved.
With respect to optimal trade quantities, note that generically q can only be optimal
if the ﬁrst-best is not achieved. Hence, to agree on q can generically only be optimal if
the ownership structure is relevant, i.e., if Ω = {S} or Ω = {B}. Similar to the one-sided
case, if Ω = {B} when trade is non-contractible then if trade is contractable q =0c a n
only be optimal if Ω = {B} still holds. Hence, quantity contracts are irrelevant if and
only if Ω = {B} and the investment incentives of the buyer are decreasing in q.W h e n e v e r
more than one organizational form is optimal it depends on the identity of the investing
party under which organizational form the accompanying trade quantity is larger: it
follows from (5) and (6) that the optimal trade quantity is lower when the investor owns
29While joint ownership of the asset, i.e., O = X,m a yi ng e n e r a lb eo p t i m a lw h e ni n v e s t m e n t sa r ei n
physical capital this is not the case when investments are transferable. This has previously been shown
by Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2001) who study transferable investments in a dynamic property-rights
framework.
30We choose this case because it ﬁts the Fisher-Body example which we present below. For the
alternative case that e O = S if trade is non-contractible the results are completely analogous.
19the asset than when he does not own it.
The following notation will be useful for the exposition of the result. The result is
illustrated in Figure 3 below:31 In cases (ii)-(iv) of Proposition 2 below qO is implic-
itly deﬁned by b Ba
¡
O,qO,a ∗¢




=1 .D e ﬁne qM ≡ q if b Ba (B,q,a)i si n c r e a s i n gi nq, and qM ≡ 0o t h e r w i s e .
Deﬁne aS ≡ aS (S,q)a n daB ≡ aB (B,0). The threshold values as used in the proposition
are deﬁned by: t1 = −1−b se
a(a∗), t2 = −1, t3 ≡− 1+b be















, t6 ≡ 1 − b se
a (a∗), t7 =1 ,t8 =1+b be
a (a∗).
Proposition 2 Take Assumptions 1-5 as given.











,a n do n l yp a r t yS (B) invests in equilibrium.
For deﬁniteness, suppose that Ω = {B} when trade is non-contractible. Then, if trade is
contractible, the optimal organizational forms and the accompanying optimal trade quan-
tities are given by:
(ii) Ω = {B,X,S} iﬀ na (q,a∗) ≤ t1 ⇒ e q = qO where qB <q X <q S,
(iii) Ω = {B,X} iﬀ t1 <n a (q,a∗) ≤ t2 ⇒ e q = qO where qB <q X,








e q = q otherwise,
(v) Ω = {S} iﬀ na
¡
qM,a S¢
>t 5 ⇒ e q = q if na (q,a∗) <t 6,
and na (q,a∗) <t 7 e q = qS otherwise,
(vi) Ω = {S,X} iﬀ t7 ≤ na (q,a∗) <t 8 ⇒ e q = qO where qS <q X,
(vii) Ω = {S,X,B} iﬀ na (q,a∗) ≥ t8 ⇒ e q = qO where qS <q X <q B,
(viii) qO > 0 and generically qO < q for each O ∈ Ω,
(ix) The ﬁrst-best is achieved iﬀ either na (q,a∗) ≤ t3 or na (q,a∗) ≥ t6 holds.
In cases (ii)-(iv) only B invests in equilibrium while in cases (v)-(vii)
only S invests in equilibrium.
Note that in the knife-edge case na
¡
qM,a S¢
= t4 we have Ω = {B,S}. In Appendix
C we provide a simple numerical example which illustrates that all cases of Proposition 2
31It is straightforward to show that the order of the threshold values is exactly as shown in Figure 3.
20may indeed occur. In the following, we highlight which diﬀerences and additional insights
relative to the one-sided case arise in the two-sided case:
Foundations of the property-rights theory (1) In contrast to the one-sided in-
vestment case, Proposition 2 (v) shows that if both parties invest the property-rights
approach may wrongly predict that some ownership structure is optimal which, given
that trade is contractible, is not the case. However, this case cannot arise if the invest-
ment incentives of the seller are decreasing in q which is equivalent to naq(0,0) < 0. Note
that in the case of Proposition 2 (vi) ownership of the asset by the buyer is still optimal
as long as it is accompanied by an exclusive dealing contract. (2) Besides providing the
exact conditions under which the property-rights approach is well founded, i.e., when
Ω = {B}, the above proposition shows that the choice of ownership structure is rele-
vant over a larger parameter range, namely when na (q,a∗) ∈ (−1,1): if this condition is
satisﬁed then X/ ∈ Ω, and hence the choice of ownership structure matters.
Figure 3 here
Contractability and organizational form (1) While the optimal organizational
form is generically unique when trade is non-contractible this is in general not true with
contractible trade, and in contrast to the one-sided investment case it is even possible
that the sets of optimal organizational forms for contractible and non-contractible trade
respectively do not overlap: for example, if Proposition 2 (v) applies then, in a verti-
cal relationship, integration is strictly optimal when trade is non-contractible while two
separate ﬁrms are strictly optimal when quantity contracts are feasible. (2) In contrast
to the one-sided case, if investments are transferable and trade becomes contractible at
a certain point in time a change in organizational form may be necessary: for example,
if Proposition 2 (vi) applies the parties need to additionally sign an exclusive quantity
contract, while if Proposition 2 (v) applies an outright move from integration to separate
ﬁr m si sn e c e s s a r y .
Eﬃciency and investing party Proposition 2(ix) predicts that generically only one
of the parties invests in equilibrium, and that for all O ∈ Ω i ti st h es a m ep a r t yw h o
invests. Moreover, whenever the non-owner invests the ownership structure is generically
irrelevant, and hence the ﬁrst-best is achieved. This is true because giving this party
21ownership would even increase her incentives. Hence, the initial arrangement could not
be optimal if it would not induce the ﬁrst-best. Moreover, by observing empirically which
of the parties invests one can draw inference about which contract terms are consistent
with equilibrium.
Interaction between organizational forms and quantity contracts (1) In con-
trast to the one-sided case, when investments are transferable it depends on the model
parameters whether the contracted quantities are larger in integrated or in separate ﬁrms.
However, the above results allow the prediction that if only the seller (buyer) invests in
equilibrium the contracted quantities should be lower (higher) between separated ﬁrms
than within an integrated ﬁrm. (2) As in the one-sided case, quantity contracts can only
be irrelevant, i.e., q = 0 can only be optimal, if the same organizational form as under
non-contractible trade turns out to be uniquely optimal when quantity contracts are fea-
sible. Hence, in the setting of Proposition 2 the lack of a quantity contract can only
be optimal within an integrated ﬁrm. (3) Finally, Proposition 2 completely characterize
when the choice of both incentive instruments is relevant.
Comparative Statics: Fisher-Body revisited The model also allows interesting
comparative static exercises: for example, one can explore how the optimal organizational
form, quantity contracts, the eﬃciency of the relationship and the identity of the investing
party evolve due to exogenous shocks on the payoﬀ functions of the parties. To illustrate
this point, we revisit the classic Fisher-Body (FB) case which has attracted considerable
attention in the transaction cost and property-rights literatures. While there are rivaling
interpretations of the case,32 our model provides support to Klein’s (2000) view that the
refusal by FB to invest in a new plant following a substantial increase in demand for
closed automobile bodies necessitated full vertical integration of FB by General Motors
(GM) in 1926 after which GM build the plant itself.33 Since 1919 the two had operated
under a supply contract which obliged GM to buy all of its automobile bodies from FB
32For example, while Coase (2000) denies that a hold-up occured prior to integration, Casadesus-
Masanell and Spulber (2000) and Freeland (2000) argue that integration was caused by human speciﬁcity
considerations.
33The 1925-26 period exhibited very rapidly growing GM sales and a dramatic shift from open to
closed autobodies which led to an increase of FB closed body sales to GM of about 200% (Klein (2000,
p. 113)). For GM’s investment, see Klein (2000, p. 118).
22but allowed FB to trade externally,34 where the fact that the contract included explicit
price terms gives some evidence that trade was contractible in our sense. In the period
prior to 1926, FB had built several plants to meet GM’s needs.35 In terms of our model,
this could be expressed as that, prior to 1926, (O = S,q = q) was observed which in
1926 changed to (O = B,q = 0) because no explicit quantity contract was in place
after that date.36 Our model can rationalize this switch: note, that these two contracts
correspond to neighboring parameter regions in Figure 3 and that the boundary between





















− 2=0 ( 8 )
As long as the left-hand side of (8) is negative, (O = S,q = q) is optimal. Arguably, an
exogenous increase in demand would have made trade, and hence a new plant more valu-
able for GM which would have caused an upward shift in its (marginal) payoﬀ functions
b ba (·)a n db be
a (·). Because the shift was relatively large the left-hand side of (8) turned
positive, and hence (O = B,q = 0) became optimal. Note, that the observed invest-
ment behavior is consistent with Proposition 2(ix).37 Hence, our model contributes to
the explanation of the Fisher-Body case: while Klein (2000) argues informally that, due
to insuﬃcient reputational capital, the rise in demand shifted the initial supply contract
outside its ”self-enforcing range” he remained unsure what exactly it was ”about the
large, unexpected demand increase by GM that caused Fisher to take advantage of the
imperfect body supply regime.”38 Our model suggests that the rise in demand increased
the contractual externality of the investment, and thereby led to the suboptimality of the
supply contract regime. More generally, the above example illustrates that our model can
34In 1919, when signing the supply contract for a horizon of 10 years, GM also acquired a 60% interest
in FB. However, as both Coase (2000, p. 22f.) and Klein (2000, p. 107ﬀ.) argue this did not provide
G Mw i t hc o n t r o lo fF B ,a n dF Bw a ss t i l lr u na sa ni n d e p e n d e n tﬁrm by the Fisher Brothers after 1919.
Summaries of the contract terms can be found at the same references.
35See Klein (2000, p. 110).
36Again, we interpret O = S as two separate ﬁrms.
37Our results build on the assumption that Ω = {B} when trade is non-contractible. In the Fisher-Body
case, this is consistent with the observed contracts: suppose to the contrary that Ω = {S} when trade
is non-contractible. In this case, an analogous argument to Proposition 2 implies that (O = B,q =0 )
could not be optimal when trade is contractible.
38Klein (2000, p. 129).
23provide guidance as to when large speciﬁc investments and incomplete contracts indeed
necessitate vertical integration.
4 Non-Contingent Contracts Suﬃce
In this section, we show that given our assumptions the parties cannot gain by considering
more complicated contracts which might depend on messages θ
B and θ
S which the buyer
and the seller respectively send between dates 2 and 3.39 To prove this, we follow the
mechanism design with renegotiation approach as advanced by Maskin and Moore (1999)
and invoke the revelation principle which allows to restrict attention to direct revelation
mechanism under which both parties have an incentive to report the ex-post state of
the world truthfully. In the more general setting considered in this section, we deﬁne
a contract C as a mapping (O,q,t):Θ2 → {B,S,X}×[0,q] ×< . The best-response
investment functions, given this more general class of contracts, are deﬁn e di nt h ep r o o f
of the proposition below. We build on results by Segal and Whinston (2002) who provide
conditions under which every sustainable investment equilibrium can be sustained by a
non-contingent contract which randomizes over organizational forms. We extend their
results in two ways: ﬁrst, by focussing on the set of optimal contracts, we strengthen
their results to non-randomizing contracts. Second, if investments are transferable in-
vestment equilibria are in general not interior, and we extend Segal and Whinston (2002)
to accommodate this case:40,41
39Note that option contracts may improve upon non-contingent contracts if parties invest sequentially
(see e.g., N¨ oldeke and Schmidt (1998) and Edlin and Hermalin (2000)).
40The result below is robust to the possibility of randomization across organizational forms. If both par-
ties make non-transferable investments, by applying results of Segal and Whinston (2002), one can show
that, as long as all investment equilibria are interior, the restriction to message-independent contracts
which randomize over organizational forms does not lead to an eﬃciency loss. However, non-randomizing
contracts are in general not optimal in this case. In the absence of a randomizing device the results of
Segal and Whinston (2002) are not directly applicable because in this case one of the decisions, namely
O, would be discrete. Whether in this case the restriction of attention from arbitrary contracts of the
form (O(·),q(·),t(·)) to non-contingent contracts (O,q,t) does not lead to an eﬃciency loss awaits future
research.
41With two-sided investments in human capital, the results of Segal and Whinston (2002) are not
applicable: while the internal payoﬀs of the parties might depend on the investments of both parties, a
party has only access to its own human capital when trading externally. Hence, in general the investments
cannot be aggregated into one dimension in the decision-dependent parts of the post-renegotiation payoﬀs
as required by Condition A in Segal and Whinston (2002).
24Proposition 3 Take Assumptions 2-4 as given and suppose that Assumption 1 holds
for any message-dependent contract C as deﬁned above. If only one party can invest or
if investments are transferable across parties, i.e., a(β,σ) ≡ β + σ, the set of optimal
contracts always contains a non-contingent contract of the form (O,q,t) for some O ∈
{B,X,S}, q ∈ [0,q] and t ∈ <.
Segal and Whinston (2002) have shown that if one allows for arbitrary message-
dependent mechanisms the equilibrium pre-renegotiation decisions e O and e q are in general
indeterminate in the sense that starting from any incentive-compatible mechanism one
can always change the equilibrium decision and subsequently modify the equilibrium
transfers in a way such that the equilibrium payoﬀs remain unchanged and the incentive-
compatibility conditions still hold. Hence, only if one imposes certain restrictions on the
set of possible contracts one can make predictions regarding the equilibrium decisions.
In the setting of Proposition 3, the restriction of attention to non-contingent contracts
seems to be justiﬁed if one assumes that there is an (arbitrarily) small cost of writing
more complex contracts.42
5 Implications for Empirical Testing
Our model has implications for the growing empirical literature on the PRT (see e.g.,
Baker and Hubbard (2001), Elfenbein and Lerner (2001), Hanson (1996), Woodruﬀ
(1996)). First, our model may shed some light on the puzzle why some empirical studies,
like Elfenbein and Lerner’s (2001) recent study of internet portal alliances, support the
PRT even though in this line of business alliance agreements contain on average two
quantity provisions relating to project output which suggests that interaction is con-
tractible in our sense. Many internet portal alliances are marketing alliances, and hence
seem to ﬁt in the framework of Section 3.2.43 Elfenbein and Lerner (2001) ﬁnd that in
42Note that non-contingent contracts are a special case of continuous contracts in which the deci-
sions are continuous in the messages of the parties. Segal and Whinston (2002) show that under some
assumptions the expected decision in any optimal continuous contract is equal to the decision in the
optimal non-contingent contract. Unfortunately, the assumptions which underlie this result, e.g., a
one-dimensional decision space (see Segal and Whinston’s (2002)Condition S), are not satisﬁed in our
model.
43In a recent paper, Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2001) argue that the joint provision of internet portals is
an especially valuable ﬁeld for marketing alliances. While Elfenbein and Lerner’s (2001) sample contains
25promotional agreements in general one of the parties provides most of the eﬀort, and they
report a signiﬁcant relationship between the identity of this party and the allocation of
ownership rights which they interpret as support for the PRT. However, they are puzzled
by a varying degree of completeness of the contracts with respect to quantity provisions.
Our model suggest that, given transferability of investments, the optimal organizational
form, quantity provisions and the identity of the investing party are all determined en-
dogenously, and that the choice of ownership structure is only relevant under certain
circumstances.44 Elfenbein and Lerner (2001) do not examine the relationship between
the observed ownership patterns and the completeness of the contracts with respect to
quantity provisions. Hence, in future work, it might be interesting to revisit Elfenbein
and Lerner’s (2001) data set in light of our theory. Second, in contrast to the PRT, our
model suggest that frequently more than one organizational form will be optimal. This
poses the problem that the theoretical prediction might not be unique. Hence, it seems
to be promising to look at industries which experience a shift in underlying parameter
values, e.g., in the demand or costs structure, such that a certain organizational form is
only optimal before the shift.45 Third, Whinston (2001) emphasizes that the informa-
tional requirements of empirical test of the PRT are high since, in principle, marginal
contributions have to be observed. Our model imposes joint restriction on potentially
observable variables, like the organizational form, the contracted level of interaction and
the identity of the investing party, which may allow informationally less demanding in-
direct test of the theory. Finally, our model suggest that settings where the investments
of the parties are embedded in an asset can serve as a valuable empirical testing ground
independent of the contractability of interaction, and that one need not conﬁne attention
to situations where interaction is not contractible.
both marketing and technology alliances one of their leading examples concerns an advertising and
promotional agreement between Autoweb.com and Yahoo! in 1998.
44This observation hints at possible endogeneity problems if one runs regressions of the ownership
structure on the identity of the investing party.
45This would be similar to the approach by Baker and Hubbard (2002) who utilize shifts in the
informational environment.
266 Extension: Spillovers Between Internal and Exter-
nal Trade
Until now, we have assumed that the threatpoint payoﬀs which the parties obtain from
external trade are independent of the internal trade quantity. In this section, we drop
this assumption, and hence [b b(O,q,a)−b b(X,q,a)] and [b s(O,q,a)−b b(X,q,a)] might vary
in q. In this more general setting, one can show that all propositions continue to hold:
only the threshold values in Propositions 1 and 2 have to be redeﬁned appropriately.46
Deﬁnition 2 (Spillovers) We speak of positive (negative) spillovers from internal on
external trade for the buyer if b be
aq (q,a) > (<)0 ∀q,a holds. Analogously, we speak of
positive (negative) spillovers for the seller if b se
aq (q,a) > (<)0 ∀q,a holds.
If spillovers are negative then, in the presence of intense internal interaction, the asset
can only be less proﬁtably employed externally. For example, this might arise if the
parties have less time to look for external trading partners or if internal trade reduces
their marginal utility from external trade. Positive spillovers might arise if, by trading
internally, the parties get better at trading externally: for example, the seller might learn
how to produce cheaper for the external market. In general, spillovers might be positive
for one party and negative for the other. The presence of spillovers allows to provide some
easily interpretable examples where the model predicts that the optimal organizational
form is unique even though quantity contracts are feasible. The conditions in these
examples have the interpretative advantage that, in contrast to the conditions in the above
propositions, they do not rely on derived entities such as aS or a∗. Recall that naq (q,a) >
(<)0 ⇔ b saq (X,q,a) > (<)b baq (X,q,a) ∀q,a. Moreover, note that in the presence of
spillovers it might depend on O whether b Saq (O,q,a)i si n c r e a s i n go rd e c r e a s i n gi nq,a n d
the subsequent examples make use of this feature. In the examples below, we assume
that both parties may make transferable investments, and we maintain the assumption
that Ω = {B} if trade is non-contractible. Given Assumption 3 and Proposition 2, the
proof that the examples below hold true is straightforward and therefore omitted.
46Under slight abuse of notation, deﬁne b se (q,a)a n db be (q,a) analogous to above. Given these deﬁ-










(E1) Suppose that both the seller and the buyer experience negative spillovers. Then, for
|naq (0,0)| suﬃciently small, we have Ω = {B}, and quantity contracts are irrelevant,
i.e., it is strictly optimal for the parties to agree on q =0 .47
(E2) Suppose that the buyer experiences positive spillovers while the opposite is true for
the seller. Then, if naq (0,0) is positive but not too large, we have Ω = {B}. While for
small values of naq (0,0) some e q>0 is optimal, trade contracts are irrelevant if naq (0,0)
is suﬃciently large.48
(E3) Contrary to (E2), suppose that the seller experiences positive spillovers while the
opposite is true for the buyer. Then, if naq (0,0) is slightly negative, either Ω = {S} or
Ω = {B} holds. While under these conditions the investment incentives of the seller are
increasing in q when he owns the asset, only when the eﬀect of q is strong enough we have
Ω = {S}. In this case, some e q>0 is optimal. If the eﬀect of q is weak then Ω = {B},
and the parties should not sign a quantity contract, i.e., e q =0 .49
Example (E1) shows that if (i) for both parties the eﬀects of a and q on the internal
payoﬀs are relatively similar, and if (ii) for both parties internal trade makes the external
use of the asset less proﬁtable then the property-rights approach is well founded. Example
(E2) shows that this is also possible if spillovers are asymmetric. While in the ﬁrst
two examples Ω = {B} even when trade is contractible, in Example (E3) the optimal
organizational form is unique but it depends on the parameter values whether Ω = {B}
or Ω = {S} holds.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In a symmetric information setting, we study how two incentive instruments, the orga-
nizational form and quantity contracts, are used to generate investment incentives. Our
model nests standard property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. We admit
47Formally, naq (0,0) ∈ (b be
aq (0,0),−b se
aq (0,0)).
48Formally, naq (0,0) ∈ (0,−b se
aq (0,0)). e q =0is only optimal if naq (0,0) >b be
aq (0,0).
49Formally, naq (0,0) ∈ (max{b be
aq (0,0),−b se









< 1 then Ω = {B} and e q =0is optimal.
28general message-dependent contracts but provide conditions under which non-contingent
contracts are always optimal. First, we contribute to the foundation of the property-
rights theory of the ﬁrm by characterizing when and when not the PRT makes correct
predictions even when trade is contractible. We show under which circumstances only the
right choice of a quantity contract, only the right choice of organizational form or both
are important to reduce the hold-up problem. Second, while maintaining the symmetric
information assumption of the PRT our model allows to study how the two incentive
instruments interact depending on the environment . This is in the spirit of the multi-
tasking literature which, however, focuses on environments of asymmetric information.
We fully characterize optimal contracts, and we illustrate how our model may shed light
on the classic Fisher-Body case. Third, even when the optimal organizational form is not
unique our model imposes restrictions on observables, and hence provides some guidance
for future empirical work on the property-rights theory.
While our model enriches the property-rights theory of the ﬁrm by introducing another
incentive instrument which can (but no always does) substitute for outright ownership50
we do not address some other criticisms which have been raised against the PRT, e.g., the
sole focus on providing incentives for non-contractible investments, the owner-manager
identity,51 the ownership of asset by ﬁrms rather than individuals52 and the embedding
of the PRT in a market context.53 Integrating all these important issues in a tractable,
uniﬁed model of the boundaries of the ﬁrm awaits future research.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Ad (vi): First, we prove part (vi) of the proposition where (C) is maximized subject
to the constraint q ≡ 0. It follows from (2) and Assumption 4 that b Sa (B,q =0 ,a) <
b Sa (X,q =0 ,a) < b Sa (B,q =0 ,a) < φ(a) ∀a which in combination with Assumptions (1)
and (3) implies e σ((B,0)) < e σ((X,0)) < e σ((S,0)) < σ∗ = a∗ because a∗ is assumed to be
50This is in the spirit of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) and Holmstrom (1999).
51For a recent paper which explicitly models ﬁrm as hierarchies, see Hart and Holmstrom (2002).
52For a paper which addresses this issue, see Rajan and Zingales (1998).
53For this issue, see e.g., Hubbard (2001) or Gans (2001).
29interior. For the proof of the remaining parts of the proposition, note that b Sa (O,q,a) −
1 ≥ 0 ⇔
na (q,a) ≥ 2φa (a
∗) − φa (a)
−[b sa (O,q,a) − b sa (X,q,a)] + [b ba (O,q,a) −b ba (X,q,a)] ∀O,q,a.
Ad (i): b Sa (X,q,a∗) − 1 < 0 ⇒ O is relevant, i.e., Ω = {S}: note, that under a contract
(X,0) which forbids external trade as well as internal trade we have b Sa (X,0,a ∗)−1 < 0.
Given this observation, b Sa (X,q,a∗) − 1 < 0a n dA s s u m p t i o n3i m p l yb Sa (X,q,a∗) − 1 <
0 ∀q. Hence, (5) implies that for all contracts that specify O ∈ {B,X} we face an
underinvestment problem, and therefore it is strictly optimal to maximize investment
incentives by specifying O = S. Given this ownership structure we show below that
overinvestment by the seller can be avoided through the right choice of q. O is relevant ⇒
b Sa (X,q,a∗)−1 < 0: When O is relevant X cannot be optimal. Hence, it must be true that
for O = X the ﬁrst-best cannot be achieved. Therefore, we must have b Sa (X,q,a∗)−1 < 0:
otherwise b Sa (X,0,a ∗) − 1 < 0 and the intermediate value theorem would imply that
there exists a b q such that a contract (X,b q) induces the ﬁrst-best. We now turn to the
optimal trade quantity. Ad q = 0: note, that na(q,σq=0) <v 1 ⇔ b Sa (S,q,σq=0) − 1 < 0.
Assumption 3 in combination with b Sa (S,q,σq=0) − 1 < 0 implies b Sa (S,q,σq=0) − 1 <
b Sa (S,0,σq=0)−1 = 0 for all q>0. Hence, (5) implies b Sa (O,q,σq=0)− 1 < 0 for all O ∈
{B,X} and q, which in combination with Assumption 2 implies that σ (β =0 ;( O,q)) <
σq=0 < σ∗ for all O ∈ {B,X} and q.A d q = q: b Sa (S,q,σq=0) − 1 > 0i nc o m b i n a t i o n
with Assumption 3 implies that b Sa (S,·)i si n c r e a s i n gi nq. This observation together with
(5) implies b Sa (S,q,a) − 1 > b Sa (S,q,a) − 1 > b Sa (O,q,a) − 1 ∀a,∀q<q,∀O ∈ {B,X}.
Hence, the contract C =( S,q) maximizes investment incentives. Given na (q,a∗) <v 2 ⇔
b Sa (S,q,a∗) − 1 < 0 we face an underinvestment problem, and therefore the described
contract is optimal. Ad q = qS: Inequalities b Sa (S,q,a∗) − 1 ≥ 0, b Sa (S,0,a ∗) − 1 < 0
(see part (vi)) and the intermediate value theorem imply that there exists a qS ∈]0,q]
(and generically qS < q)w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes b Sa
¡
S,qS,a ∗¢
−1 = 0. Hence, the contract (S,qS)
induces the ﬁrst-best. Moreover, note that b Sa (X,0,a ∗)−1 < 0 which in combination with
Assumption 3, b Sa (X,q,a∗)−1 < 0 and (5) implies that: b Sa (B,q,a∗)−1 < b Sa (X,q,a∗)−
1 < 0 ∀q. Hence, under an arbitrary contract (O,q)w i t hO ∈ {B,X} the ﬁrst-best cannot
be achieved.
Ad (ii)+(iii): the proof of the Ω-part is analogous to (i), and therefore omitted. Ω = {B},
Ω = {X,B}, Ω = {X} or Ω = {S,B} are not possible because it follows from the above
discussion that X ∈ Ω implies S ∈ Ω,a n dt h a tB ∈ Ω implies X,S ∈ Ω.I fΩ 6= {S} if
follows from the proof of part (i) that the ﬁrst-best is achieved for all O ∈ Ω, and hence
an analogous intermediate value theorem argument as above implies that the optimal
trade quantities are as given in the proposition.
Ad (iv)+(v): Follows directly from the proofs of the other parts of the proposition.
30B Proof of Proposition 2
Ad (i): (5), (6), Assumption 1 and Assumption 4 imply that a∗ >a j(j,0) ≥ aj(X,0) ≥
aj(i,0) for j,i = B,S, j 6= i. Hence, it follows from Assumption 1 that it depends











from which the claim follows im-
mediately.
To prove (ii)-(vii), we ﬁrst characterize Ω.N o t et h a t
(a) aj(S,q) ≥ (≤)aj(X,q) ≥ (≤)aj(B,q) ∀q for j = S (B)
(b) aj(j,0) >a i(j,0) for i,j ∈ {B,S} and i 6= j,a n d
(c) aS(X,0) = aB(X,0),
(9)
where (a) follows from (5), (6) and Assumption 1. Note that the inequalities in (a) are
strict whenever the respective left-hand side (right-hand side) is strictly positive. Claims
(b) and (c) follow from b Sa (0,q,a) > b Ba (O,q,a) ⇔ b sa (O,q,a) > b ba (O,q,a) ∀O,q,a
and Assumption 1. If the ﬁrst-best cannot be achieved the contract which maximizes
investment incentives is optimal since generically only one party will invest in equilibrium.
Moreover, if, for a given O, we have e a(O,q) ≥ a∗ for some q then the ﬁrst-best can
be achieved under organizational form O because e a(O,q) is continuous in q.H e n c e ,
e a(O,0) <a ∗ ∀O and the intermediate value theorem imply that there exists a b q such
that e a(O,b q)=a∗. Hence, it is useful to denote the maximal total equilibrium investment
which is sustainable under ownership structure O by e aO ≡ maxq e a(O,q). We claim:















Consider e aB: Assumption 3 implies that if aB(B,q)i si n c r e a s i n gi nq then e aB = aB(B,q).




. Hence, e aB is given
by the above expression. The proof for e aS is completely analogous. Assumption 3 and
aS(X,0) = aB(X,0) imply the solution for e aX.
Ad (iv): In the following, we show that Ω = {B} iﬀ (a) e aB > e aS,e aX and (b)











. Ad (b): It fol-





b Sa (S,q,a∗), b Ba (X,q,a∗) < 1. Now, we argue that b Ba
¡
B,qM,a S¢





1 ⇒ b Sa (S,q,a∗) < 1. This claim holds true if b Ba
¡
B,qM,a S¢
> 1 implies aS <a ∗.I f
qM = 0 this follows immediately because Proposition 2(i) implies aS <a B(B,0) <a ∗.
Now assume b Ba
¡
B,q,aS¢
> 1 and suppose to the contrary that aS ≥ a∗ which im-




> 1a n db Sa (S,q,a∗) ≥ 1 are mutually compatible iﬀ b se
a (a∗)+b be
a (a∗) >
2φa (a∗) which is impossible given Assumption 4. It follows from (1), (2) and (7) that
conditions (a) and (b) are equivalent to the conditions which are stated in the proposition.
Ad (v): Analogous to (iv) and therefore omitted.









which does not hold true
because aS(X,q) ≤ aS(S,q)a n daB(X,q) ≤ aB(B,q). Hence, either e aS > e aX or e aB > e aX




≥ a∗. Now, suppose aS(X,q) ≥
a∗ which implies aB(X,q) ≤ aB(X,0) <a ∗ and a∗ ≤ e aX = aS(X,q) <a S(S,q) ≤
e aS.H e n c e , O = S is optimal as well. Moreover, aS(S,q) >a ∗ implies aB(S,q) ≤





a∗. Next, we show that given aS(X,q) ≥ a∗ it is not possible that aB(B,q) ≥ a∗:
Suppose to the contrary that aB(B,q),a S(X,q) ≥ a∗ which together with the above
discussion implies b Ba (B,q,a∗), b Sa (S,q,a∗) ≥ 1. Assumption 4 and b Sa (S,q,a∗) ≥ 1
imply 2 + na (q,a∗) > 1+b se
a (a∗)+na (q,a∗) ≥ 2 which implies na (q,a∗) > 0. Hence,
b Ba (B,q,a∗)=φa(a∗) − na (q,a∗)+b be
a(a∗) < 1 which is a contradiction to aB(B,q) ≥ a∗.
Hence, e aB ≥ a∗ iﬀ aS(B,q) ≥ a∗. To summarize: Ω = {S,X} iﬀ aS(X,q) ≥ a∗ >
aS(B,q), and Ω = {B,S,X} if aS(B,q) ≥ a∗. In both cases the seller invests. Again, it
follows from (1), (2) and (7) that these conditions are equivalent to the conditions which
are stated in the proposition. The proof for the remaining case that aB(X,q) ≥ a∗ is
completely analogous and therefore omitted.
Ad (ix) Before we proceed to characterize the optimal trade quantities, we prove
part (ix) of the proposition. Regarding the ﬁrst-best: the if-part follows immediately
from the discussion above. With respect to the only if-part: if Ω = {B,S} the ﬁrst-
best cannot be achieved: suppose to the contrary that e aB,e aS ≥ a∗ which together
with the fact that X/ ∈ Ω, i.e. a∗ > e aX, implies e aB = aB(B,q)a n de aS = aS(S,q),
and hence aB(B,q),a S(S,q) ≥ a∗. However, it has been shown above that this is not
possible. Hence, if Ω = {B,S} it has to be the case that e aS = aS(S,q)=e aB =
max{aB(B,q),a B(B,0)}. Therefore, all combinations (β,σ) such that β + σ = aS(S,q)
are consistent with equilibrium. The investment behavior in the cases where Ω 6= {B,S}
follows directly from the characterization of Ω above.
Finally, we characterize the optimal trade quantities. Ad (ii), (iii), (vi), (vii): in these
cases, part (ix) implies that the ﬁrst-best is achieved, and that only the seller (buyer)
invests in cases (vi) and (vii) ((ii) and (iii)). Hence, the results follow immediately from
Assumption 4 and inequalities (5) and (6). Ad (iv), (v): a contract (S,0) cannot be
optimal because this would contradict our assumption that Ω = {B} when trade is non-
contractible. Hence, if Ω = {S} either the ﬁrst-best is achieved or, if this is not possible,
i.e., if b Sa (S,q,a∗) ≤ 1, it is optimal to maximize incentives by setting e q = q. Note, that




> e aS ≥ aS(B,q). Moreover,
if Ω = {B} then e q =0i ﬀ e aB = aB(B,0). Hence, if Ω = {B} and if the ﬁrst-best
cannot be achieved, i.e., na(q,a∗) >t 3, the optimal quantity is given by e q = q (e q =0 )











− 2 ≡ t4 implies the result. Ad (vii): The claim immediately follows
from Assumptions 4 and 3.
The proof that the order of the threshold value is as shown in Figure 3 is straightfor-
ward, and therefore omitted.
32CN u m e r i c a l E x a m p l e
This simple numerical example serves to illustrate Proposition 2. Suppose that the partial
derivatives of the ex-post surplus and the threatpoint payoﬀs with respect to a are given
by φa (a) ≡ 3
1+a, b sa (O,q,a) ≡ s·q+IS · 1
1+a and b ba (O,q,a) ≡ b·q+IB · 2
1+a respectively
where IS (IB)i se q u a lt o1i fO = S (O = B) and 0 otherwise. Suppose that q =1 ,




= s − b, na
¡
qM,a S¢
=m i n {s − b,0}, t1 = −4
3, t2 = −1, t3 ≡− 1
3,
t4 ≡ 0, t5 = 2
4 − 5
4(s − b), t6 ≡ 2
3, t7 =1 ,t8 = 5
3. Note that, given these threshold
values, [na (q,a∗) >t 2 ∩ na
¡
qM,a S¢
<t 5]i se q u i v a l e n tt o−1 <s− b<2
5.M o r e o v e r ,





· (1 − 2
3IB + 1






· (1 − 1
3IS + 2
3IB).
D Proof of Proposition 3
For the purpose of the proof, consider the more general class of contracts C00 =[ pB,p S,p X,q,t]:




≤ 1 ∀O denotes the probability with which









without loss of generality, one can restrict attention to direct mechanisms which induce
truth-telling on and oﬀ the equilibrium path the best-response investment functions of B,
given this more general class of contracts, is deﬁned by β (σ;C00) ≡ argmaxb β
P
pO(b β,σ)·
b B(O,q(b β,σ),a(b β,σ)) − b β − t(b β,σ)w h e r epO(θ) ≡ pO(θ,θ)a n dq(θ) ≡ q(θ,θ) ∀O,θ ∈
[0,β] × [0,σ]. The best-response function of S is deﬁned analogously. For the moment,
consider some message-independent decisions pB, pS ∈ [0,1], q ∈ [0,q]a n dt = 0, and sup-
pose that the equilibrium investments of both parties are interior, i.e., 0 < e β(C) < β and









Note, that Assumption 3 implies that qmax and qmin are independent of a and qmax,qmin ∈










O · b Sa (O,q,a) ≤ b Sa (S,q
max,a) ∀O,q,a. (10)
Note, that the decision space [0,1]3 × [0,q] is compact and connected, and that the
functions φa, b Sa and b Ba are continuously diﬀerentiable in all arguments except O (which,
however, is not a decision variable given the larger class of contracts which we consider).
Hence, Condition A of Segal and Whinston (2002) is satisﬁed in our framework. Inequality
(10) implies that their Condition H± is satisﬁed as well. Our Assumption 2 is the analog to
their Condition C. Hence, Segal and Whinston’s (2002) Proposition 4 applies, i.e. if there
is a message-dependent contract C00 which sustains an interior investment pair (β,σ)t h e n
there exists a non-contingent contract (pB,p S,p X,q)f o rs o m epB,p S,p X ∈ [0,1], q ∈ [o,q]
which also sustains (β,σ).
If only the seller invests, note that inequality (10) and Assumption 2 imply
P
pO ·
54We assume that renegotiations occur after the realization of the randomly determined organizational
form.
33b Sa (O,q,a) ≤ b Sa
¡
S,qmax,σS¢
≡ 1 ∀pO,q and a ≥ σS, where σS denotes the equilibrium
investment level given the contract (pB,p S,p X,q)=( 0 ,1,0,qmax). Note that σS > 0
due to Assumption 1. The above inequality implies that if σS ≤ a∗ than the contract
(0,1,0,qmax)i so p t i m a l .I fσS >a ∗ it follows from Assumption 4 that qmax = q.H e n c e ,
Assumption 2 implies b Sa (S,q,a∗) > 1 > b Sa (S,0,a ∗). Because b Sa is continuous in q the
Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there exists a q∗ such that b Sa (S,q∗,σ∗)=1 .
Hence, in this case the contract (0,1,0,q∗) is optimal. Hence, the set of optimal contracts
always contains a contract of the form (O,q)f o rs o m eO ∈ {B,X,S} and q ∈ [0,q].
Now, suppose that investments are transferable and consider an arbitrary contract of




. Under slight abuse of notation, deﬁne aS(e C) ≡ argmaxa{
P
pO·
b S(O,q,a) − 1} and deﬁne aB(e C) analogously. Note, that the aj(e C)’s, and hence e a(e C)
are not only continuous in q but in pB,p S and pX as well. Suppose an arbitrary message-
dependent contract C00 =[ pB,p S,p X,q,t]:Θ2 → [0,1]3 × [0,q] ×<sustains an interior
investment vector (e β,e σ)w h e r e0< e β < β and 0 < e σ < σ.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e ﬁrst part
of the proof implies that the restriction of attention to non-contingent contracts of the
form (pB,p S,p X,q)w h e r epB,p S,p X ∈ [0,1], q ∈ [o,q] is possible. We now show that the
same holds true if an arbitrary contract C00 sustains an investment vector (e β,0) where
0 < e β < β.T h e c a s e ( 0 ,e σ)w h e r e0< e σ < σ is completely analogous and therefore
omitted. Since C00 sustains (e β,0) an investment e β > 0 by the buyer is a best-response to
σ = 0. Now, consider the exactly same situation but assume that only the buyer has the
possibility to invests, i.e., suppose it is exogenously given that σ ≡ 0. In this correspond-
ing one-sided investment problem it is still a best-response to choose e β given the original
contract C00.B e c a u s e 0 < e β < β, i.e., e β is interior, the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o o fi m p l i e s
that for this corresponding one-sided investment problem there exists a non-contingent




which also sustains e β.H e n c e ,e β = aB(e C). Now, let us return
to the original two-sided problem: there it is still a best-response to choose e β given σ =0
and e C. The characterization of equilibrium investments in Section 3.2 implies that in the
two-sided problem, given contract e C, either (e β,0) or (β,σ)w h e r eβ + σ ≥ e β emerges as
investment equilibrium. If β + σ ≤ β
∗ + σ∗ contract e C leads to higher welfare than the
initial contract C00.I fβ +σ > β
∗ +σ∗ then Assumption 4, the Intermediate Value Theo-
rem and the observation that e a(·) is continuous in pB,p S and q implies that there exists
a non-contingent contract C which induces the ﬁrst-best a∗ = β
∗ + σ∗. Hence, we have
shown that, if an message-dependent contract C00 induces an investment pair (e β,0) where
0 < e β < β, then there always exists a non-contingent contract of the form (pB,p S,p X,q)
which leads to weakly higher welfare. In a next step, we show that the set of optimal
contracts always contains a contract which assigns probability one to some O:c o n s i d e r
a non-contingent contract C0 =
£
pB0,p S0,p X0,q0¤
where pO0 > 0f o rs o m eO0 ∈ {B,X,S}




∀O ∈ {B,S,X}. Without loss of generality, suppose that e a(CS) ≥ e a(CO) ∀O which
implies that e a(CS) ≥ e a(C0). If e a(CS) ≤ β
∗ + σ∗ then CS leads to weakly higher welfare
than C0.I fe a(CS) > β
∗ +σ∗ then, because e a() is continuous in q, the Intermediate Value
Theorem and e a((S,0)) < β
∗ +σ∗ imply that there exists a e q such that e a([S, e q]) = β
∗+σ∗
which concludes the proof.
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Figure 3: Properties of optimal contracts
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